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International Law as Part of Our
Law: A Constitutional Perspective
Michael D. Ramsey*
"International law is part of our law," the U.S. Supreme Court declared
some one hundred years ago in The Paquete Habana.' Conventional
wisdom in modem scholarship assumed, at least until four years ago, that
this meant international law in the U.S. legal system had a status akin to
federal common law.2 In a 1997 Harvard Law Review article, Professors
Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith ignited an academic firestorm by
challenging this assumption.' In particular, Bradley and Goldsmith argued
primarily that international law did not (or should not) operate like federal
common law in at least two key respects: it should not preempt inconsistent
state law; and it should not form a basis for federal jurisdiction.4
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego Law School. Thanks to Curtis Bradley, William
Dodge, Jack Goldsmith, Ernest Young, and the participants in the 2001 international law symposium
at Pepperdine University School of Law, at which a version of these comments was first delivered.
1. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ I 11,
115 (1986); Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555,
1561 (1984) [hereinafter Henkin, International Law]; Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority,
and the Preemptive Power of International Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 303 (1995); Michael J.
Glennon, Raising The Paquette Habana: Is Violation of Customary International Law by the
Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 321, 348-58 (1985); Jules Lobel, The Limits of
Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV.
1071, 1116-20 (1985); Jordan J. Paust, The President Is Bound by International Law, 81 AM. J.
INT'L L. 377, 382 (1987); Frederic L. Kergis, Jr., Federal Statutes, Executive Orders and "Self-
Executing Custom," 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 371, 374-75 (1987).
3. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley &
Goldsmith, Customary International Law]. See also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The
Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997)
(elaborating the position) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy]; Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Incorporation of International Law into Federal Law: A
Response, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260 (1998) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Incorporation of
International Law].
4. Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 3, at 870; Bradley &
Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 3, at 319-331.
Although much debate erupted over these claims,5 little of it has cast
itself primarily as constitutional interpretation, and none of it, so far as I am
aware, has taken the Constitution's text as its central authority.6 This article
offers a constitutional perspective on the continuing controversy, specifically
in the context of international human rights litigation, and specifically
addressed to the Constitution's text. I argue that the Bradley/Goldsmith
position, rather than being a single claim about the status of international
law, is properly viewed as a series of claims about particular parts of the
Constitution, some of which are more persuasive than others.7
My observations proceed in three parts. Part I provides a summary of
the international-law-as-federal-law debate.8 It also briefly addresses why
this academic debate matters to practitioners of international human rights
law: in sum, because in much international human rights litigation in federal
court, federal jurisdiction is based upon international law, which Bradley
and Goldsmith would not allow.' Part II offers a constitutional perspective
on Bradley and Goldsmith's central contentions, namely that international
law is not federal law for purposes of supremacy or jurisdiction."° First, I
point out that these are two very different claims based on differently
worded provisions of the Constitution: the supremacy claim depends on
Article VI, while the jurisdictional claims arise from Article Ill." As a
result, the claims should be analyzed separately. In undertaking this separate
analysis, I argue that the text, history, and structure of the Constitution
strongly support the Bradley/Goldsmith view with respect to supremacy, but
are much more ambiguous with respect to jurisdiction. I conclude,
5. For criticism of various aspects of the Bradley/Goldsmith position, see, e.g., Harold Hongju
Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998); Gerald L. Neuman,
Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997) [hereinafter Neuman, Sense and Nonsense]; Beth
Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law after Erie, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 393 (1997) [hereinafter Stephens, Law of Our Land]; Ryan Goodman & Derek P.
Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1997).
6. Some recent scholarship has begun to tie the debate more explicitly to the Constitution's text.
See Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort, Statute and Article Ill, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. - (forthcoming
2002); William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some Observations on Text
and Context, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. - (forthcoming 2002).
7. In the ensuing discussion, following Bradley and Goldsmith and their critics, I consider only
unwritten international law (sometimes called "customary" international law) and do not address
international obligations imposed by treaty. Treaties are dealt with separately in the Constitution,
see, e.g., U.S. CONST. arts. III, VI, and accordingly are appropriate for separate treatment. Thus in
speaking of "international law" I mean international law not reflected in a treaty. See MARK W.
JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1999) (discussing sources of
international law).
8. See infra pp. 103-07.
9. Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 3, at 847-48, 870.
10. See infra pp. 107-17.
11. See U.S. CONST. arts. Il, VI.
[Vol. 29: 187, 2001] International Law as Part of Our Law
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
therefore, that it may be possible to accept the more persuasive parts of the
Bradley/Goldsmith position without fatally undermining international
human rights litigation. Finally, in Part III, I outline some continuing
constitutional objections to using international law to convey federal
jurisdiction in international human rights litigation. 2
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS FEDERAL LAW: THE RECENT DEBATE AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS
A. The Bradley/Goldsmith Position and the Academic Response
The Bradley/Goldsmith position, simply stated, is that international law
is not federal law,'3 meaning primarily that it is not a basis for federal
jurisdiction and does not preempt inconsistent state law." Bradley and
Goldsmith argue, first, that in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries no
one thought international law was federal law.'5 Rather, everyone thought
that international law was part of something called "general law" or "general
common law" that federal courts could apply in cases otherwise properly
before them, but that international law did not have the jurisdictional and
supremacy characteristics associated with federal law.'6 Thus, when cases
like Paquete Habana said that "international law is part of our law," they
meant that it was part of "general common law" as applied by U.S. courts,
but not that it was preemptive of state law or supportive of federal
12. See infra pp. 117-18.
13. Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 3, at 817.
14. Id. at 870-873; Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 3, at 319-331. Bradley
and Goldsmith further argue against two less conventional implications of international law's
supposed status as federal law: that international law might supersede prior inconsistent federal law
and that it might bind presidential actions. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law,
supra note 3, at 842-46. For other critiques of various aspects of the international-law-as-federal-
law position, see Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary International Law, 42
VA. J. INT'L L. - (forthcoming 2002); A.M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and International
Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1988) [hereinafter Weisburd, Executive Branch]; A.M. Weisburd,
State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1995) [hereinafter
Weisburd, State Courts]; Philip Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33
UCLA L. REv. 665 (1986).
15. Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra, note 3, at 860-70.
16. Id. at 822-26.
jurisdiction.'7 Indeed, as Bradley and Goldsmith point out, no case during
this period gave international law preemptive or jurisdictional effect.'8
In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, the U.S. Supreme Court abolished the
concept of "general common law" and said that on substantive matters,
absent a relevant U.S. statute or constitutional provision, federal courts
should apply the law of the state in which the court was sitting.'9 This,
Bradley and Goldsmith argue, altered the position of international law in the
U.S. legal system: international law is not based on the Constitution or a
federal statute, and per Erie it could no longer be applied as "general
common law," so its applicability depended upon whether it had been
adopted as binding law by the relevant state.2" In keeping with this view,
Bradley and Goldsmith contend, for almost fifty years after Erie courts did
not apply international law as federal law.2' Then, in 1980, in the well-
known international human rights case Filartiga v. Peiia-Irala, the Second
Circuit wrongly said that international law was federal law on the basis of
the pre-Erie holdings that international law was part of "our law."2  As
Bradley and Goldsmith argue, Filartiga misread the earlier cases, since the
nineteenth century view was that international law was "general law," not
federal law.23
Bradley and Goldsmith's position has been disputed aggressively in the
scholarly literature. The attack comes principally at two levels. The first
asserts, with the Filartiga court, that the nineteenth century cases are valid
precedent for the incorporation of international law into federal law,
17. The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 667 (1900); Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International
Law, supra note 3, at 845.
18. Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 3, at 822-26.
19. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("Except in matters governed by the
Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied ... is the law of the state."). Erie
relied, at least in the first instance, on the Federal Rules of Decision Act, which provides that federal
courts should apply state law in the absence of federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000). In this
respect Erie overruled Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), which had held that the Rules of Decision
Act did not apply to matters covered by general common law. See Young, Sorting Out the Debate,
supra note 14 (forthcoming).
20. Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 3, at 870.
If a state chooses to incorporate [customary international law] into state law, then
the federal courts would be bound to apply the state interpretation of [customary
international law] on issues not otherwise governed by federal law. If a state did
not, in fact, incorporate [customary international law] into state law, the federal
court would not be authorized to apply [customary international law] as state or
federal law.
Id.
21. See Bergman v. De Sieyes, 170 F.2d 360, 361 (2d Cir. 1948) (finding that, with respect to an
issue of ambassadorial immunity under customary international law, the state courts' "interpretation
of international law is binding upon us, and we are to follow them so far as they have declared
themselves.").
22. Filartiga v. Pefla-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that "the law of nations...
has always been part of the federal common law.").
23. Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 3, at 833-34.
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whatever the doctrinal machinations of Erie.2' A second, more intricate
response observes that, after Erie, federal courts evolved a body of federal
common law in areas of particular federal concern. 2 For example, in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the Supreme Court applied the common-law
based "act of state" doctrine as a matter of federal common law to prevent
judicial review of the sovereign acts of foreign nations.26  This federal
common law, as exemplified by Sabbatino, had the jurisdictional and
supremacy characteristics of federal law." International law, the critics of
Bradley and Goldsmith assert, should be viewed as part of that post-Erie
federal common law.2
B. Implications for International Human Rights Litigation
This seemingly abstract debate matters to practical litigation because it
suggests that, if Bradley and Goldsmith are correct, federal courts may lack
jurisdiction over many international human rights cases. The paradigm
international human rights case is brought under the Alien Tort Statute
("ATS"), which declares that federal courts have jurisdiction over a suit by
an alien for a tort committed in violation of international law." This has
been the posture of a number of leading cases: Filartiga, brought by the
survivors of a Paraguayan citizen tortured to death by Paraguayan officials;"
Kadic v. Karadzic, brought by victims of ethnic violence in the former
Yugoslavia against Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic;3' and claims by
Philippine citizens against former Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos, for
human rights violations committed while in office.
2
24. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885; Stephens, Law of Our Land, supra note 5, at 402-420.
25. Stephens, Law of Our Land, supra note 5, at 402-20.
26. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (stating the
common-law act of state rule as "the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory.").
27. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425-27 (concluding that federal court interpretations of the act of state
doctrine, as a matter of federal common law, are supreme over state court interpretations). See also
Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972) (concluding that federal "arising under" jurisdiction
"will support claims founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory origin.").
28. E.g., Neuman, Sense and Nonsense, supra note 5, at 375-76; Stephens, Law of Our Land,
supra note 5, at 434-47.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States."). This law is sometimes labelled the "Alien Tort Claims Act."
30. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
31. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1996).
32. In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992).
Scholars and judges have raised various statutory and prudential
objections to the use of the ATS as a basis for such suits, particularly when,
as is often the case, neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants have much
connection with the United States.3 These objections have been met with
more or less persuasive answers, ' and federal appellate courts (including in
Filartiga, Karadzic and Marcos) have allowed these claims to proceed."
Overshadowing this litigation, however, is a troubling constitutional
objection, for if the Bradley/Goldsmith position is correct, the ATS is, as
applied in these cases, very likely unconstitutional.
The reason is simple. In all of these cases the plaintiffs are aliens, and
in most (including Filartiga, Karadzic and Marcos) the defendant is as
well.36 Indeed, the basic idea of this type of litigation is to bring to justice
perpetrators of international human rights offenses - offenses usually
committed by non-citizens against non-citizens in foreign nations. 7 Article
III of the U.S. Constitution, which sets forth the maximum scope of the
federal courts' jurisdiction, does not contain an obviously applicable
category.38 There is no general alien-against-alien jurisdiction in Article III;
the claims do not arise under the U.S. Constitution or a federal statute;
diversity jurisdiction is unavailing since it requires that, at minimum, one
party be a U.S. citizen; and various special subjects of jurisdiction such as
33. John Rogers, The Alien Tort Statute and How Individuals "Violate" International Law, 21
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 47 (1988) (arguing that the statute should be limited to violations the
United States is obligated to punish); Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law
of Nations, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 445, 447 (1995) (arguing that the ATS was
intended to apply only to certain admiralty claims); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (arguing that the ATS should be limited to historical offenses
such as assaults on ambassadors). See also Michael D. Ramsey, Multinational Corporate Liability
Under the Alien Tort Claims Act: Some Structural Concerns, - HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
__ (2002) (suggesting caution in applying the ATS broadly on prudential grounds).
34. William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the
"Originalists," 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 221 (1996); Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien
Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461 (1989);
Anthony D'Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of the Constitution, 82 AM. J. INT'L L.
62 (1988); William R. Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in
Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467 (1986).
35. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881; Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 238; Marcos, 978 F.2d at 493. See also
Abaebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (1 1th Cir. 1996); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th
Cir. 1994); Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992). But see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (dismissing human rights suit brought under the ATS).
36. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881; Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 238; Marcos, 978 F.2d at 493.
37. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International
Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J.
53 (1981); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Fulfilling the Promise of Filartiga: Litigating Human Rights Claims
Against the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 65 (1995); Beth Stephens, The Civil
Lawsuit as a Remedy for International Human Rights Violations Against Women, 5 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 143 (1995) [hereinafter Stephens, Violations Against Women].
38. U.S. CONST. art. III. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 31-32 (5th ed.
1994) (noting that statutory grants of jurisdiction must fit within one of the jurisdictional categories
of Article III).
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admiralty are usually inapplicable.39 Though on its face the ATS appears to
give federal courts jurisdiction over alien-against-alien -claims, it cannot
extend federal jurisdiction beyond the limits of Article IH."
This problem is solved by Paquete Habana's conclusion that
international law is part of our law, together with modem scholarship's
interpretation of that observation to mean that international law functions as
federal common law." If international law is part of federal common law,
then the ATS claims arise under federal common law, which is sufficient to
establish federal jurisdiction under modem Supreme Court precedents." If,
as Bradley and Goldsmith argue, international law is not federal common
law, it is difficult to find an alternative Article III basis for jurisdiction over
alien-against-alien ATS claims. 3 As a result, the academic debate over the
Bradley/Goldsmith position has serious implications for the continuing
validity of much international human rights litigation."
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UNITED STATES LAW: A CONSTITUTIONAL
PERSPECTIVE
From a constitutional perspecive, there are two striking aspects of the
debate over the Bradley/Goldsmith position. First, the Constitution's text
39. WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 31-32.
40. It is not sufficient to say that the claims arise under federal law simply because they arise
under the ATS, a federal statute. The details of this argument are beyond the scope of this
discussion, but it should be obvious that if Congress can make any body of law federal merely by
passing a statute giving federal courts jurisdiction over it, then the Article III limits on jurisdiction
are meaningless. See WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 27, 31-32. An alternative line of argument,
discussed at length by Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, is that the ATS itself creates a cause of
action (in addition to being a jurisdictional grant), either directly or by delegation to the federal
courts. Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 3, at 357-363. If true, this might
support federal "arising under" jurisdiction even if international law, standing alone, does not. I
express no view here on this line of reasoning, except to note that it is controversial. See Curtis A.
Bradley, Customary International Law and Private Rights of Action, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 421, 425
(2000); William R. Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction oer Torts Committed in
Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. Rev. 467, 479 (1986).
41. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
42. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885-86 (2d Cir. 1980); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111(2) (1986); Henkin, International Law,
supra note 2, at 1560-61. See also Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1971) (concluding that
federal jurisdiction is present in a case based on federal common law).
43. Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 3, at 356-58. See also Burley,, supra
note 34, at 468 (suggesting this result). In ATS cases where the defendant is a U.S. citizen, these
jurisdictional difficulties may not arise because ordinary diversity jurisdiction would often apply.
See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
44. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 3, at 330 ("What is at stake is the
enforceability of international human rights law in the U.S. federal courts.").
has been underemphasized. At bottom, everyone understands that this is a
question of constitutional law: federal courts are creatures of the
Constitution; it is the Constitution that gives (or does not give) federal courts
the power to adjudicate international law. 5 Yet, the widespread academic
discussions arising from Bradley and Goldsmith's claim have been largely
occupied with historical and doctrinal contentions in which constitutional
text has played at best a secondary role. 6 Little extended textual analysis
exists with respect to the matter.
Second, everyone treats the debate as centering upon a single question:
whether international law is federal law.47  Once focused on the
Constitution's text, however, it is apparent that Bradley and Goldsmith are
making at least two separate claims about two distinct and differently
worded parts of the Constitution. The question of international law's
supremacy over state law is governed by the supremacy clause of Article
V. 46 The question of international law as a basis for federal jurisdiction is
governed by Article 119.9 These provisions are not identical nor even
similarly worded.0  Because most debate over the Bradley/Goldsmith
position asks the single question whether international law is federal law, it
assumes that Bradley and Goldsmith are either right on both points, or
wrong on both points. Conceiving of the debate as two separate
constitutional claims, as I suggest, raises the possibility that this is not an all-
or-nothing battle: that is, Bradley and Goldsmith could be right on one claim
and wrong on the other.
45. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 3, at 819 ("International
law does not itself answer these questions. Rather, the answers must be found in U.S. law. In the
first instance, that law is the U.S. Constitution."). See also Bradley & Goldsmith, Current
Illegitimacy, supra note 3, at 321 (discussing constitutional implications); Weisburd, State Courts,
supra note 14, at 28 (discussing "the argument that customary international law is federal common
law").
46. See, e.g., Neuman, Sense and Nonsense, supra note 5, at 373-383 (emphasizing historical and
doctrinal developments); id. at 383-88 (emphasizing democratic and international values); Stephens,
Law of Our Land, supra note 5, at 399-448 (emphasizing historical developments).
47. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 3, at 817 ("We conclude
that, contrary to conventional wisdom, [customary international law] should not have the status of
federal common law."); Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 3, at 319 ("We
conclude[] that courts should not apply [customary international law] as federal law .... ");
Stephens, Law of Our Land, supra note 5, at 460 (framing the question as "the status of international
law as federal common law").
48. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
49. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
50. See U.S. CONST. art. M (giving federal jurisdiction to claims arising under "laws of the
United States"); U.S. CONST. art. VI (giving preemptive effect to laws "made in pursuance [of the
Constitution]"). With respect to the debate over the President's responsibility to uphold international
law, see supra note 13, Bradley and Goldsmith also appear to be making a claim about Article II,
Section 3 ("[The President] shall take Care that the laws be faithfully executed"). See Bradley &
Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 3, at 842-46.
[Vol. 29: 187, 2001] International Law as Part of Our Law
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
In the ensuing sections, I separate Bradley and Goldsmith's
constitutional claims and consider each of them with a close focus upon the
Constitution's text. I argue that this approach enhances the
Bradley/Goldsmith position with respect to supremacy and weakens their
position with respect to jurisdiction. The supremacy claim is most clearly
rooted in unambiguous constitutional text, most clearly supported by
historical and structural considerations, and most evidently unaffected by
Erie. The jurisdictional claim, however, is the one that threatens ATS cases.
As a result, I conclude, it is possible to accept the stronger part of the
Bradley/Goldsmith position without giving up on international human rights
litigation.
A. International Law and Supremacy
Bradley and Goldsmith's first contention is that international law does
not preempt inconsistent state law." Viewed as a question of constitutional
law, the Constitution's text provides a relatively straightforward answer.
Supremacy of federal law over state law arises from Article VI of the
Constitution, which states that the Constitution, treaties, and "the laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof shall be the supreme
Law of the Land." 2 The question Bradley and Goldsmith pose, therefore, is
whether international law is part of the "laws" encompassed by this clause -
that is, "laws of the United States made in pursuance" of the Constitution.
On this point, the plain language of the Constitution leaves little room
for ambiguity. Whether or not international law is part of "the laws of the
United States," it is in any event, not "made in Pursuance" of the
Constitution, for the parochial U.S. Constitution is not within international
law's contemplation. Much international law preexists the Constitution; that
which does not has arisen independently and without regard to it. As Louis
Henkin has written, international law is made "in a process to which the
United States contributes only in an uncertain way and to an indeterminate
degree."53
51. Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 3, at 327.
52. U.S. CONST. art. VI. On the importance of the Supremacy Clause to claims of preemption,
see Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321
(2001); Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non) Treaty Power 77 N. CAR. L. REV
133, 218-25 (1998).
53. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 508 n.16 (2d ed. 1996).
Henkin further concedes that Article VI "does not easily include international law." Id. He goes on
to argue, in a way not always easy to follow, that international law is supreme and preemptive.
Henkin, International Law, supra note 2, at 1560-62. Bradley and Goldsmith include some
discussion of the textual point, but do not make it a central focus. See Bradley & Goldsmith,
As a result, the Constitution's plain language shows that international
law's putative status as "federal law" is simply irrelevant. Whether or not
international law is "part of our law," it is not preemptive law, because it
does not fit within the language of Article VI.
There is no reason to think that the modem understanding of the phrase
"made in pursuance" of the Constitution differs, from the ordinary meaning
of those words in 1789. Although much about international law has changed
since 1789, we share the framers' view of international law as arising
external to the United States, formed by the community of nations." There
is no reason to think that they would have understood international law (or,
as it was then known, the "law of nations") as made in pursuance of the
Constitution, so that our modem understanding would fail to honor their
meaning,5 nor is there any reason to think that they had in mind a
fundamentally different and unrecognizable conception of international law,
such that fundamentally changed circumstances would justify a modem
departure from the text. Rather, they, like us, recognized a body of law
arising outside the United States to which the United States owed an
obligation, and they wrote the supremacy clause in a way that did not
include that body of law.
The framers also understood that international law would likely come
into conflict with the laws and actions of the states. Indeed, a leading
concern at the Philadelphia convention was that states had violated
international law during the Confederation period and the national
government had lacked power to intervene. 6 This had occurred both with
respect to treaties (whose obligations were confirmed by international law)
and customary rules. Focusing on these problems, the framers deliberately
wrote treaties into Article VI to assure a judicial remedy for treaty
violations. 7 Yet they declined to provide a parallel remedy for violations of
non-treaty international law, even though they spoke of the two problems in
tandem." Instead, they provided a different remedy for non-treaty violations
Current Illegitimacy, supra note 3, at 321 n.12.
54. See Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV.
819, 821-28 (1989) (discussing the framers' conception of the law of nations); id. at 832-33
(specifically considering and rejecting the idea that the framers could have understood international
law to be "made in pursuance" of the Constitution).
55. See Stephens, Law of Our Land, supra note 5, at 412 (affirming "the framers' understanding
of the law of nations as existing independently of the United States"). As James Wilson said, "to
pretend to define the law of nations which depended on the authority of all Civilized Nations of the
World, would have a look of arrogance that would make us look ridiculous." 2 RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 615 (Max Farrand ed. 1911).
56. See Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth of Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power, 42 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 379, 420-24 (2000); FREDERICK MARKS, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 52-95 (1973).
57. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 277 (1796) (opinion of Iredell, J.) (discussing the violations
of treaties).
58. See I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 19 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
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by giving Congress the power to define and punish offenses against the law
of nations 9 - a power Congress lacked under the Articles of Confederation.'
These events strongly suggest a deliberate decision not to include customary
international law as supreme law, and thus to give Congress (rather than the
federal courts) the power to decide when state law must give way to
international law.
Further, post-constitutional practice provides no basis for departing from
the ordinary meaning of Article VI. If international law had been thought to
preempt state statutes, that matter should have arisen directly, for states
surely did not always comply with international law during this period. 1
Yet, as Bradley and Goldsmith show, 2 in the nation's early years no case
applied international law to preempt state law under Article VI.63 To be sure,
it was often said that international law was part of United States law, but that
is consistent with finding it not to be preemptive, for Article VI does not say
that all "laws of the United States" are preemptive. Moreover, no one
thought it was absurd that international law could be applied by federal
courts in the absence of controlling state authority and yet not have
preemptive effect; rather, it was understood that state and federal courts had
concurrent authority in the interpretation of international law.' This simply
would not have been possible if Article VI included international law, for, at
minimum, Article VI would in that case require that federal court
interpretations of international law be binding in later state court decisions.
(statement of Randolph describing the difficulties of the Articles of Confederation with respect to
violations of treaties and the law of nations).
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
60. See Ramsey, Myth of Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power, supra note 56, at 420-24.
61. Curtis A. Bradley, The Status of Customary International Law in U.S. Courts - Before and
After Erie, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 807, 815 (1998).
62. Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 3, at 822-26; Bradley &
Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 3, at 331-36. For Bradley and Goldsmith, the lack of
precedent or practice giving international law supremacy within the U.S. legal system is a critical
component of their case. See id. at 323 ("Our critique... beg[ins] with history."). I would say,
instead, that the history confirms that the ordinary reading of the text is the correct one.
63. That is, it was not thought, by operation of Article VI, to preempt state statutory law.
However, state interpretations of "general common law" (which included international law) were not
thought (at least by some) to control federal court interpretations of the general common law. See
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). This, however, did not arise as a matter of Article VI preemption,
for while the state interpretations did not control the federal courts, the federal interpretations also
did not control state courts. Rather, state and federal courts "considered themselves free to exercise
independent judgment in cases arising under the law of nations." Bradford R. Clark, Federal
Common Law; A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L., REv. 1245, 1283 (1996) [hereinafter
Clark, Federal Common Law].
64. Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 57, at 1283.
The textual focus I propose also undermines what at first seems to be the
strongest argument against the Bradley/Goldsmith position on supremacy.
As illustrated by Paquete Habana, for many years judges and commentators
have said (albeit somewhat loosely) that "[i]nternational law is part of our
law., 65 A quick look at the Bradley/Goldsmith position might suppose that
Bradley and Goldsmith contend that international law is not part of our law,
flatly contrary to Paquete Habana. However, the focus on Article VI shows
that, with respect to issues of supremacy, Bradley and Goldsmith argue more
precisely that international law is not "made in Pursuance" of the
Constitution. Not only does that seem self-evidently correct as a textual
matter, but it also exhibits no tension with Paquete Habana. It could be true
that international law is part of our law but not made in pursuance of the
Constitution. Paquete Habana, and all the other authorities declaring that
"international law is part of our law," did not say that international law is
part of preemptive law. 66
Close attention to the Constitution's text also shows the irrelevance of
Erie, and the development of post-Erie federal common law, to the
supremacy question. Whether or not the federal courts redesignated
international law as federal law after Erie, they could not change
international law into something it is not, namely something made in
pursuance of the Constitution. Whether international law is part of federal
law is little more than a question of legal categories, which we (or the Court)
can alter by changing the contours of the categories. Whether international
law is made in pursuance of the Constitution is a matter of fact, not subject
to judicial re-interpretation: international law is and always has been
something that arises and evolves outside the control of the domestic legal
system. Relatedly, the development of preemptive federal common law in
the wake of Erie does no violence to the language of Article VI, so long as
one believes that federal common law is made by federal courts pursuant to
their constitutional authority. 7 International law, not made by federal courts,
65. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). Paquete Habana itself, having been decided
111 years after the Constitution was ratified, may not be thought especially persuasive evidence of
the Constitution's meaning. But similar phrasing can be found in sources chronologically much
closer to the founding. See, e.g., 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 27 (1792) (opinion of Edmund Randolph)
(stating that the law of nations "is essentially a part of the law of the land."). See infra Part II.B.
66. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 (applying international law in the absence of
controlling legislative, executive or judicial authority). Relatedly, separation of the supremacy and
jurisdictional aspects of the Bradley and Goldsmith position reinforces their supremacy claims in
another respect. As Bradley and Goldsmith concede, their view with respect to jurisdiction is
contrary to established precedent, such as Filartiga, in the court of appeals. But this court of
appeals precedent, which turns on the proposition that international law is part of our law, per
Paquete Habana, has nothing to do with the language of Article VI (which was not at issue in
Filartiga and like cases). No appellate case has ever held that international law preempts state law.
67. See generally Clark, Federal Common, Law, supra note 57. See also Stephen B. Burbank,
Federal Judgments Law: Sources and Authorities and Sources of Rules, 70 TEX. L. REv. 1551, 1577
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is for supremacy purposes not analogous to the post-Erie federal common
law.
Focusing on Article VI highlights a further constitutional argument in
favor of the Bradley/Goldsmith position. Central to the thinking of the
Constitution's framers was the idea of a federal system. As Professor
Bradford Clark has recently argued, Article VI is an often-overlooked but
critical linchpin of federalism.68 It assures that laws achieve preemptive
status through a process involving input from the states: the Constitution,
ratified by the states; treaties, approved by a supermajority of the Senate;
and laws made under the Constitution, approved by Congress, in which
states have some element of representation.69 As Professor Clark argues, this
system provides that state laws are not displaced except through processes
that involve the states." Awarding international law preemptive status
subverts this process, for it would displace state laws without state input.'
Accordingly, there are sound structural reasons to give Article VI its natural
reading to exclude international law.72
(1992) ("Sabbatino is best regarded... as authority... for the power of the federal judiciary to
make uniformly applicable rules .. ") (emphasis added).
68. Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 52.
69. As discussed above, and as Professor Clark acknowledges, in limited circumstances federal
courts may fashion rules of federal common law that have preemptive status as "laws made in
pursuance" of the Constitution. Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 63. To be laws made in
pursuance of the Constitution, however, these need to be in areas the Constitution can be read to
grant lawmaking authority to the courts, as in admiralty, or in areas where Congress by statute has
constitutionally invited federal court lawmaking. Id. It is hard to see how either category can be
expanded to encompass all of international law. In any event, since federal courts have not adopted
international law as preemptive federal common law, the most that can be said is that federal courts
may (but are not required to) adopt specific common laws rules that parallel international law rules,
if and when the traditional grounds for creation of federal common law are satisfied. For federal
courts to adopt all of international law, prospectively, as preemptive law would, however, essentially
read the "made in pursuance of" language out of Article VI.
70. Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 52.
71. Nor does such a reading of Article VI leave gaps in the federal government's authority over
international law, for international law may be given preemptive force if codified in a treaty pursuant
to Article H, sectin 2, or codified in a statute through Congress' power to "define and punish ...
offenses against the law of nations," in Article I, section 8.
72. Bradley and Goldsmith make a related argument framed in terms of democratic values. In
their view international law as conceived by many modem authorities is increasingly focused on the
way a nation treats its own citizens, and as a result, "since the new [customary international law]
now regulates many of the same topics as domestic law, it conflicts more frequently with domestic
law." Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 3, at 329. Democratic values suggest,
they say, that in a case of conflict domestic, democratically-achieved law should prevail, until the
political branches of U.S. government have indicated a preference for the international standard. Id.
at 328-331. As a constitutional argument, however, this suffers from its lack of connection to
identifiable constitutional values. Even if we agree that democratic theory supports the structure
Bradley and Goldsmith propose, there is no basis for saying that such a democratic theory is
I conclude, therefore, that Bradley and Goldsmith's claims about
supremacy have a solid basis in the text of Article VI, and that the structure
and history of the Constitution provide no ground for departing from the
text's ordinary meaning.
B. International Law and Federal Jurisdiction.
The part of the Bradley/Goldsmith claim that threatens ATS litigation
turns not upon Article VI, but upon Article III. As a general matter, in ATS
litigation there is no need to establish that international law overrides state,
presidential or congressional action. Article VI simply is not relevant. The
constitutional text instead is Article III, which establishes the jurisdiction of
the federal courts." In contrast to their claim under Article VI, the
Bradley/Goldsmith claim that Article III does not encompass international
law seems weaker on at least four grounds.
First, the relevant constitutional language is ambiguous, because Article
VI and Article III do not use parallel language. Under Article III, federal
courts have jurisdiction over claims "arising under.., the laws of the United
States."74 While international law is plainly, not "made in pursuance" of the
Constitution, as required by Article VI, it might be part of the "laws of the
United States," if one thought (as Paquete Habana said) that international
law is "part of our law."75 "Laws of the United States" might mean laws
created by the authority of the United States (which would not include
international law), or it might mean laws to which the United States is
subject (which would include international law). The text of Article III,
standing alone, can bear either reading.
Moreover, when combined with the language, of Article VI, there is
some textual reason to prefer the more expansive reading of Article III. The
Bradley/Goldsmith position would read the relevant language of Article VI
and Article III to encompass the same set of laws (laws made in pursuance
of the Constitution), even though the phrasing of Article VI and Article III is
quite distinct. Other things being equal, constitutional interpretation should
favor a reading that gives full meaning to each phrase, rather than assuming
that different locutions mean the same thing. The broader reading of Article
III finds a set of laws - namely, international law - that is included in Article
III but not Article VI, and thus accounts for the difference in phrasing. The
Bradley/Goldsmith position has no similar solution.
embraced by the Constitution simply because we like it. Reorienting the argument toward the
structural values of Article VI shows why this is a constitutional preference, as opposed to merely a
good one.
73. See supra Part I (discussing the relationship of the Bradley/Goldsmith position to
international human rights litigation).
74. U.S. CONST. art. II.
75. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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As a result, specific focus on the constitutional text, which I have urged
is the appropriate starting point in this debate, reveals that Bradley and
Goldsmith do not have as powerful. a basis for. their jurisdictional claims as
they do for their supremacy claims."6 Unlike Article VI, Article III is
ambiguous; it remains to ask which reading of "the laws of the United
States" should be preferred. Moreover, the burden of pursuasion is now
differently allocated. In consulting history and structure in evaluating the
Article VI claim, we were seeking to confirm an apparently unambiguous
textual provision. Under such circumstances, only powerful contrary
evidence should prevail. In contrast, under Article III the text is ambiguous,
so there is no textual presumption to overcome.
Second, near-contemporaneous statements suggest that, in other
contexts, some members of the constitutional generation included
international law within their understanding of the laws of the United States.
For example, U.S. Attorney General Edmund Randolph, a member of the
Philadelphia Convention, opined that "the law of nations, although not
specially adopted by the Constitution or any municipal act, is essentially a
part of the law of the land."7 Alexander Hamilton referred to the law of
nations as within "the laws of the land" which the President was charged
with enforcing."8 Thus Paquete Habana's idea that "international law is part
of our law" has antecedents dating to the constitutional generation. These
observations are, of course, not decisive, and none was made in the specific
context of the jurisdictional status of international law. They are, however,
much more troubling to the Bradley/Goldsmith jurisdictional claim than to
the supremacy claim. As discussed above, such observations are perfectly
consistent with Bradley and Goldsmith's supremacy claim: one may easily
say that, while international law is part of our law, it is not law made
pursuant to the Constitution, and thus is not included in Article VI. It is
more difficult to say that, while international law is part of the law of the
land, it is not included among the "laws of the United States" in the meaning
of Article III. The constitutional question is what the framers meant by the
phrase "laws of the United States," and it seems clear that at least some
76. Although Bradley and Goldsmith place some reliance on the plain language of Article VI,
they do not discuss Article m11's distinct language in much detail. See Bradley & Goldsmith,
Customary International Law, supra note 3.
77. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 27 (1792) (opinion of Edmund Randolph). See also I Op. Att'y Gen.
57 (1795) (opinon of William Bradford); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 68 (1797) (opinion of Charles Lee).
78. Alexander Hamilton, Letters of Pacificus, No. 1 (1793), reprinted in 15 ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 34 (H. Syrett ed., 1969).
members of the constitutional generation in some contexts used "laws of the
United States" to include international law.79
Relatedly, a number of the leading members of the constitutional
generation, in describing the jurisdictional aspects of the Constitution, stated
that the federal courts would have jurisdiction over all cases arising under
the law of nations. John Jay wrote in the Federalist that "the national
Government, treaties, and articles of treaties, as well as the law of nations,
will always be expound in one sense, and executed in the same manner -
whereas adjudications on the same points and questions, in thirteen
States... will not always accord or be consistent. ,, 0 Plainly, though,
that would not "always" have been true unless the law of nations was itself a
basis for federal jurisdiction. Similarly, George Mason said of the
Convention: "[tihe most prevalent idea [was] to establish.., a judiciary
system with cognizance of all such matters as depend on the law of
nations ....",8 These observations might simply be mistaken as to the
nature of the Philadelphia Convention's final product, but they do show that
the idea of unified national jurisdiction over all matters arising under the law
of nations was well within the framers' contemplation. 2
Third, the early historical record is not nearly so favorable to Bradley
and Goldsmith with respect to jurisdiction as it is with respect to supremacy.
True, there are apparently no cases in the early years of the Constitution
finding Article III "arising under" jurisdiction on the basis of international
law. However, unlike supremacy, it is much more likely that these cases
simply did not arise during that period. The lower federal courts as a
statutory matter lacked federal "arising under" jurisdiction until after the
Civil War. 3 Moreover, the most common international law cases to arise in
79. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The separation of the jurisdictional argument and the supremacy
argument works against Bradley and Goldsmith here. They argue in part that, whatever the
"international law is part of our law" formulation meant, it did not mean that international law was
U.S. law because no one thought international law was preemptive. See Bradley & Goldsmith,
Current Illegitimacy, supra note 3. But this argument assumes that there cannot be any law that is
part of "the laws of the United States" that is not preemptive. That is not necessarily so, and indeed
the distinct phrasing of Article III and Article VI suggests otherwise. See U.S. CONST. arts. III, VI.
80. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 95 (John Jay) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (emphasis added). But
see THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 445-50 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (providing
a detailed description of the bases of federal jurisdiction in Article 11, without asserting that the law
of nations was part of federal "arising under" jurisdiction.").
81. Stewart Jay, supra note 54, at 830 (quoting letter from George Mason to Arthur Lee, (May
21, 1787), reprinted in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 24 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911).
82. As Professor Jay points out, one way of understanding these statements is that the framers
thought that the specific enumerations in Article III - admiralty, ambassadors, etc. - covered all of
the aspects of the law of nations that might reasonably be expected to arise. Stewart Jay, supra note
54, at 830-31.
83. The U.S. Supreme Court did have jurisdiction to review decisions of state courts "repugnant
to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States" under the 1789 act, but apparently no case
raising the international law question arose until 1875. See Weisburd, State Courts, supra note 14, at
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the early years of the Constitution fell within another grant of federal
jurisdiction, typically admiralty or cases affecting ambassadors. Thus, the
lack of precedent linking ,international law to "arising under" jurisdiction is
not persuasive evidence that this was not intended as a constitutional
matter.84
Further, the precedent of the ATS itself is troubling to the
Bradley/Goldsmith position. The original version of the ATS was passed as
part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, written by framer and future Supreme
Court Justice Oliver Ellsworth."5 Other things being equal, this may be taken
as some evidence of the original reading of the Constitution. Yet, neither
Ellsworth nor any of his fellow legislators thought the ATS was
unconstitutional. 6 If international law is part of the "laws of the United
States" mentioned in Article III, Ellsworth was right; if not, Ellsworth's
handiwork was, in part, unconstitutional. This is not, of course, decisive,"
39. To be sure, as Bradley and Goldsmith show, once that question did arise, federal courts held that
this grant did not include international law. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886); City and
County of San Francisco v. Scott, 111 U.S. 768, 769 (1884); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92
U.S. 286, 286-87 (1875). But these cases were far removed from the drafting of the Constitution and
may simply have misinterpreted its meaning. Moreover, these cases were decided as a statutory
matter, so technically they were not even addressed to Article lII (although the language they were
interpreting was parallel).
84. Bradley and Goldsmith cite only one case from before the Civil War that bears on the
question. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 3, at 324 n.28; Bradley &
Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 3, at 824 n.53. In American Ins. Co. v. Canter,
26 U.S. 511, 545-46 (1828), the Court held that the Florida Superior Court, a territorial court created
by Congress, lacked jurisdiction over a claim of maritime salvage, since this was not a claim arising
under federal law. Id. (The Florida court had as a statutory matter been given "arising under"
jurisdiction but, unlike the Article III courts, had not been giving admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction). Bradley and Goldsmith interpret this case as demonstrating that claims under
international law (or, as it was then called, the law of nations) did not arise under federal law. See
also Weisburd, State Courts, supra note 14, at 30 (reaching a similar conclusion). It is not so clear
that the maritime law in Canter was understood as a claim under the law of nations. Nowhere in the
Canter opinion is the claim said to arise under the law of nations. The events in question occurred
entirely within Florida. It seems that the matter was one that Florida could have legislated, had it
wished, but it the absence of a Florida law the court applied general common law. Thus Canter may
be precedent that the general common law did not convey federal jurisdiction, but it is not self-
evidently a precedent that the law of nations did not convey federal jurisdiction.
85. See generally Burley, supra note 34 (arguing that the ATS and the Judiciary Act were a
response to the Founders' beliefs that the nation should implement international law rules that
directly regulate individual conduct); Casto, supra note 34 (reviewing the legislative history of the
statute).
86. Casto, supra note 34, at 515.
87. Another part of the Judiciary Act was famously declared unconstitutional. Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (invalidating Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 173).
but it should give some pause to those who would read Article III's "laws of
the United States" narrowly."
Fourth, the structure of constitutional government is less clearly in
Bradley and Goldsmith's favor with respect to their Article III claim.
Federalism advises against non-Article VI preemption 9 but has little to say
about permitting federal jurisdiction over nonpreemptive suits. No serious
interests of the states appear to be at stake if a federal court hears a human
rights suit between two non-citizens that does not implicate state law. As a
result, the structural reasons for reading Article VI narrowly do not exist
with respect to Article III.
In sum, it may be possible to argue that international law is
nonpreemptive U.S. law - i.e., it is encompassed by Article III but not by
Article VI. Such a view accepts Bradley and Goldsmith's strongest points
while maintaining a constitutional basis for ATS litigation. It has a number
of advantages over a complete rejection of the Bradley/Goldsmith position
(the approach taken by many human rights litigators who feel threatened by
it). A complete rejection has difficulty circumventing the plain language of
Article VI and explaining almost two centuries of contrary practice. The
approach I suggest, in contrast, fits comfortably within constitutional text,
structure, and practice. This view also most closely conforms with existing
precedent, as the federal courts of appeal have accepted international law as
a basis for federal jurisdiction in ATS cases such as Filartiga and Karadzic
but have not given international law preemptive status.'
Significantly, separating the supremacy claim and the jurisdictional
claim eliminates one of the strongest arguments against Article III
jurisdiction over international human rights cases. The argument runs as
follows: (i) federal courts have jurisdiction over ATS cases only if
international law is part of federal common law; (ii) if international law is
part of federal common law, it must be preemptive; (iii) making
international law preemptive of state law is untenable structurally,
historically and precedentially; (iv) therefore international law is not part of
federal law and no federal jurisdiction exists in ATS cases.9' This argument
88. One view is that Ellsworth mistakenly thought that the Constitution conveyed diversity
jurisdiction over suits between aliens. See Casto, supra note 30. That, however, seems a greater
departure from the text than reading "laws of the United States" to include international law.
Another view is that the ATS should be subject to the implicit limitation that one party must be a
U.S. citizen. See Bradley, Alien Tort Statute and Article III, supra note 6 (forthcoming). This is
also a textual stretch, in this case of the language of the ATS, but probably one that John Marshall, at
least, would have accepted. See Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. 12 (1800) (per Marshall, C.J.)
(construing Section 11 of the Judiciary Act, which gave diversity jurisdiction to suits involving
aliens, to require at least one U.S. party in order to preserve its constitutionality).
89. See supra Part ILA; Clark, Seperation of Powers, supra note 52, at 1283.
90. See Brilmayer, supra note 2, at 303 (acknowledging the practice while arguing that it is
mistaken).
91. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. v. Wiwa (filed January 19,
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errs in assuming that the jurisdictional and supremacy arguments are
identical - that is, that international law must be preemptive and jurisdiction,
or neither. This simply does not follow from the constitutional language.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION: CONTINUING
CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS
In the preceding sections, I have argued that it is possible to view
international law as nonpreemptive U.S. law. This arises from the difference
in the wording of Article III (relating to federal jurisdiction) and Article VI
(relating to preemption). As a result, one can embrace much of the
Bradley/Goldsmith position yet accept the continuing validity of most
international human rights litigation in U.S. court.
This position is not without its difficulties, however, and resolving these
difficulties seems an important task for international human rights
scholarship. That resolution is beyond the scope of this article, but having
raised the possibility of international law as nonpreemptive federal law, it
seems appropriate at least to lay out the challenges for that position.92
Most importantly, the proposed interpretation of Article III raises the
possibility of serious redundancy. If Article III's grant of jurisdiction over
claims "arising under" federal law includes claims arising under
international law, several of the other grants of jurisdiction in Article III may
seem superfluous.93 For example, Article III also gives federal jurisdiction
over cases arising in admiralty. ' Particularly in the eighteenth century,
nonstatutory admiralty claims would have been, as a general matter,
governed by international law. If admiralty jurisdiction was already covered
by "arising under" jurisdiction, what was the point of the admiralty clause?95
The proposed interpretation is also in some tension with the drafting
history of Article III. In one early draft federal jurisdiction specifically
2001), at 28 ("Filartiga also has radical implications for domestic governance.... If Filartiga were
correct, then norms of international law ... would preempt inconsistent state laws and practices.
Whlesale federal court supervision of the several states for compliance with unwritten principles of
international law would follow."); Weisburd, State Courts, supra note 14, at 4 ("Nor does [Filartiga]
consider the potentially sweeping effect of the rule it apples. . . . [If customary international law is
federal law, it must displace state law in the event of a conflict.").
92. For a series of forthcoming articles exploring this issue in greater detail, see Bradley, The
Alien Tort Statute and Article III, supra note 6 (forthcoming); Dodge, The Constitutionality of the
Alien Tort Statute, supra note 6 (forthcoming).
93. See, e.g., Weisburd, Executive Branch, supra note 14, at 1223 (making this point); but see
Stewart Jay, supra note 54, at 831 (discounting it).
94. U.S. CONST. art. Im.
95. Relatedly, the proposed interpretation must accommodate the clause in Article I, section 8
granting to Congress the power to define and punish offenses against the law of nations.
included claims "which may arise.., on the Law of Nations.96 The drafters
subsequently added more specific references to particular aspects of the law
of nations, such as admiralty and cases affecting ambassadors, and deleted
the reference to the law of nations. Some explanation must be provided as to
why the drafters made this change.97
In addition, a number of leading scholars of the early history of U.S.
common law conclude that legal theorists of the time did not conceive of the
law of nations as "federal law." Speaking of the early nineteenth century,
for example, Professor Clark argues:
The law of nations was not "law" as we usually think of it today -
that is, a sovereign command .... In essence, the law of nations
operated as a set of background rules that courts applied in the
absence of any binding sovereign command to the contrary.
Because of the character of such law, federal and state courts had no
occasion to characterize the various branches of the law of nations
as either federal or state law. At the time, it was thought to be
neither."
Such comments generally are not made specifically in the context of
assessing Article III jurisdiction, and, as I have argued, there is a difference
between finding that international law is not "federal law" (a term with no
constitutional significance) and finding that international law is not part of
the "laws of the United States" (the relevant question under Article III).
Nonetheless, these commentaries give some reason to doubt whether the
constitutional generation understood the law of nations to be part of "the
laws of the United States."
Finally, as Bradley and Goldsmith point out,99 the judicial practice of the
late nineteenth century seems squarely against the proposed interpretation. 1°"
Indeed, cases of this period treat the matter not as a controverted question,
but as a self-evident legal maxim.'"' This was, moreover, a period in which
96. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 136 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). See
Weisburd, State Courts, supra note 14, at 4 (relying on this development to argue against general
federal jurisdiction over the law of nations).
97. One explanation, of course, might be that they thought the law of nations was part of the
"laws of the United States," and thus deleted the specific reference to the law of nations because they
thought it was redundant. I am not aware of any drafting history actually supporting this hypothesis,
however.
98. Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 4, at 1279-80. See also Stewart Jay, supra note 54,
at 832. But see Edwin Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United
States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26 (1952) (taking the opposing view).
99. Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 3, at 824 n.53; Bradley &
Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 3, at 332 n.64.
100. See e.g., Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886); City and County of San Francisco v.
Scott, 111 U.S. 768, 769 (1884); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286, 287 (1875).
101. See e.g., Ker, 119 U.S. at 444 (stating briefly and without citation that "though we might or
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federal courts, including the Paquete Habana decision, repeated the mantra
"international law is part of our law."'" Thus, at least in the late nineteenth
century, federal courts thought international law did not establish federal
"arising under" jurisdiction even though international law was "part of our
law." That, of course, is not decisive as to the correct understanding of the
constitutional text, either as an original matter or today, but at minimum it
seems a matter that calls for some explanation.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article seeks to make three observations about the international-
law-as-federal-law debate. First, this is a question of constitutional law. As
such, it should be approached using the ordinary tools of constitutional
interpretation. In particular, the text of the Constitution should be the
starting point, and analysis of the text in light of its structure and history
should play a central role in reaching the correct interpretation.
Second, close attention to the text reveals that this matter cannot be
reduced to the single question, "Is international law federal law?" The
matter instead involves at least two distinct questions: whether international
law is preemptive (governed by Article VI); and whether international law is
the basis for federal jurisdiction (governed by Article III). Because the
language and structural implications of these constitutional provisions are
different, they should be analyzed separately. Although the commentary has
generally assumed that international law has either both characteristics or
neither, separating the analysis shows that it is at least possible that
international law might have one characteristic but not the other.
Third, examining the two questions separately and with close attention
to the text reveals that the argument against the supremacy of international
law is quite strong, while the argument against the jurisdictional status of
international law is weaker. Article VI requires that, for a law to be
supreme, the law must be "made in Pursuance" of the Constitution.103
International law cannot fit that description, for international law is made
entirely outside the U.S. legal system. Structural and historical
considerations bear out this natural reading of the text."° On the other hand,
Article III requires for federal "arising under" jurisdiction only that a law be
might not differ with the Illinois court on [a matter of the law of nations], it is one in which we have
no right to review their decision.").
102. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
103. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
104. See supra Part I.A.
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part of "the laws of the United States."'' 5 Whether this includes international
law is a difficult question, particularly in light of founding-era statements to
the effect that international law "is part of the law of the land." Further,
much of the structural and historical evidence against international law
supremacy is weaker or simply does not apply against the jurisdictional
claim. For example, making international law preemptive over state law has
substantial federalism effects, but making international law jurisdictional,
and thus permitting alien-against-alien suits such as those based on the ATS,
has less impact upon the relative power of the states."° I do not argue that
international law is clearly included within the jurisdictional grants of
Article III, and indeed I have noted above some serious objections to that
position,"' but I do conclude that a definitive case against inclusion of
international law in Article III has yet to be made.
105. U.S. CONST. art. III.
106. See supra Part U.B.
107. See supra Part III.
